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The Physics of Dissent and the Effects of Movement Momentum 
 
Erica Chenoweth1*, Margherita Belgioioso2 
 
Abstract: How do people power movements succeed when modest proportions of the 
population participate? We propose that the effects of social movements increase as they gain 
momentum. We approximate a simple law drawn from physics: momentum equals mass times 
velocity (p=mv). We propose that the momentum of dissent is a product of participation (mass) 
and the number of protest events in a week (velocity). We test this simple physical proposition 
against panel data on the effects of movement momentum on irregular leader exit in African 
countries between 1990-2014 using a variety of estimation techniques. Our findings show that 
social movements often compensate for relatively modest popular support by concentrating 
their activities in time, thereby increasing their disruptive potential. Crucially, these findings 
also provide a straightforward way for dissidents to easily quantify their coercive potential by 
assessing their participation rates and increased concentration of their activities in time. 
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Introduction 
From East Germany to the Philippines, Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Armenia, Algeria, and 
Sudan, people-power movements often topple entrenched regimes with surprisingly peaceful 
efficacy—even when relatively small numbers of people participate. How do movements 
succeed when modest proportions of the population participate? Although a recent 
experimental study identified a 25% tipping point in the ability of coordinated groups to revise 
or overthrow existing systems1, free-riding behavior often prevents movements from 
mobilizing more than 5% of a country’s population2. Yet strikingly, most mass uprisings that 
have mobilized 3.5% of the population against dictatorships have nevertheless succeeded in 
overthrowing them3,4—far less than critical mass thresholds of 10-25% tipping points 
identified in prior studies1,5,6,7. We propose that the momentum of dissent is a product of 
participation (mass) and the number of protest events in a week (velocity) (p=mv). We test the 
correlation between movement momentum and irregular leader exit in African countries 
between 1990-2014. Our findings show that movement momentum is significantly correlated 
with irregular leader departure. Crucially, these findings provide a straightforward way for 
dissidents to easily quantify their coercive potential by assessing their participation rates and 
increased concentration of their activities in time. 
 Although extant research finds that large numbers of participants increase the chances 
of movement success3, the impact of participation on the effectiveness of civil resistance 
movements is based on reported peak participation, rather than dynamic ebbs and flows of 
participation. For instance, Chenoweth and Stephan4 identify a million participants in the 
People Power movement in the Philippines, rather than capturing the number of reported 
participants in each of the hundreds of protest events linked to that movement from 1983-
1986. Accounting only for peak participation rates neglects the effect of dynamic 
participation on the success of civil resistance campaigns over time. In other words, there is 
no ability to understand how changing levels of participation may have contributed to 
Ferdinand Marcos’ departure. Additionally, existing research is generally poor at identifying 
the timing of success for social movements. Most existing studies, in fact, use yearly data on 
different features of movements and their opponents4. As such, researchers have not yet 
understood how movements effectively build initiative in ways that tip them over into 
success—particularly in the face of repression. The characteristics of successful social 
movements are better understood than their dynamics. 
 In this article, we advance two core propositions. First, we argue that, although the size 
of participation is indeed a crucial determinant of the success of mass uprisings, it is an 
incomplete indicator of movement potential. Instead, we argue that movement momentum may 
be essential to understanding the strength of mass mobilization. We argue that momentum is 
determined by both the number of participants and the concentration of dissident activities in 
time: the interaction between movement size and velocity. Second, we propose that the 
momentum movements deploy on a daily basis is strongly correlated with major political 
changes. We find support for these intuitions by testing them on irregular leader exits in African 
countries between 1990-2014. Although the research design does not allow us to make causal 
claims, our findings suggest that nonviolent dissidents may be able to use insights from physics 
to leverage publicly-accessible indicators to estimate the momentum they can bring to bear 
against their adversaries on any given day. 
 We turn to a simple analogy from physics—that momentum equals mass times velocity 
(p=mv)—to show how activists can estimate their momentum using publicly-available 
indicators. In social movements, one proxy for mass is the number of observed participants in 
nonviolent events (including protests, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, marches, and other 
nonviolent methods3,8. We introduce a proxy for velocity, which we operationalize as the 
number of protests observed in a given week. We estimate momentum by multiplying the 
number of observed participants per thousand people in the national population by the number 
of protest events in the week prior to the current day. We operationalize mass, velocity, and 
momentum using various alternative measures, including a logarithmic transformation of the 
mass indicator; see the discussion in the methods section below. 
There are many reasons to assume that the momentum of mobilization—rather than just 
mass participation—is an important driver of major political and social changes. We expect 
that momentum creates repeated and visibly unrelenting interactions between dissidents and 
state elites, which may elicit key defections among ruling elites. Often, economic elites, state 
media authorities, cultural authorities, or civilian bureaucrats refuse to continue cooperating 
with regime leadership during periods of mass discontent. These loyalty shifts among key 
elites—typically sparked by mass mobilization—are often the lynchpin in securing the victory 
of months- or year-long mass movements. Such mechanisms have proved critical to successful 
mass movements around the world. For example, in 1980s and 1990s South Africa, mass 
protests, consumer boycotts, and international sanctions and divestments from abroad were 
ultimately so economically and politically disruptive that white business elites demanded that 
the Apartheid regime negotiate with the African National Congress.  
Movement momentum—where large numbers of dissidents amass over a sustained 
period, rather than just in a one-off event—may be particularly influential in convincing 
security forces to end their cooperation with the incumbent regime. As large numbers of 
dissidents persist in concentrated mass mobilizations, momentum may make repression more 
politically costly, leading security forces to rethink their loyalties. The fact that security force 
behaviour is often important in determining the outcomes of mass movements is well-
established in the literature on social movement success3,4,8,9. For instance, in October 2000, 
protestors in Serbia mobilized after fraudulent elections against Slobodan Milosevic. Police 
officers ultimately refused to obey orders to fire on demonstrators or abandoned their posts, 
recognizing members of their own communities or families in the crowd. Protestors then 
stormed the Parliament, and Milosevic fled the country and conceded the election to the 
opposition leader. We have observed similar dynamics in countries as diverse as the Philippines 
(1986), Tunisia (2010), and Iran (1979). 
What is less understood is how movements have built critical mass to activate such 
behavior. We suggest that as the momentum of mass mobilization increases – as a function of 
the mass of participants and velocity of nonviolent dissent – pressure may increase among the 
population and among elites to demand or orchestrate a change in national leadership.  
We articulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: Movement momentum—mass times velocity—is positively correlated 
with the likelihood of movement success. 
 
Results 
We test this proposition by estimating the effects of the momentum of nonviolent 
dissent on the relative risk of leadership irregular exit through a newly compiled dataset of 
country-day observations in Africa from 1990-2014. Our unit of analysis is the country-day, 
reflecting our focus on the effect of temporally granulated contentious dynamics, rather than 
structural or time-invariant characteristics of states and of non-state actors. Our dataset builds 
on the Social Conflict Analysis Database (SCAD)10, which includes information on 
participation and occurrence of protests, riots, strikes, inter-communal conflict, government 
violence against civilians, and other forms of social conflict not systematically tracked in other 
conflict datasets, as well as the ARCHIGOS dataset11, which identifies the manner by which 
rulers leave political power.  To obtain the dependent variable, we looked for instances in which 
the leader lost power through irregular means, defined as leader removal “in contravention of 
explicit rules and established conventions”11. This form of exit is exceedingly rare, occurring 
only 45 times out of over 295,000 observations in Africa between January 1, 1990 and January 
1, 2014. We then conducted additional desk research on each instance to produce a strict 
measure that excludes cases of leader irregular exit due to assassinations or coups that appeared 
to be part of internal political maneuvers or personal vendettas outside of the underlying 
context of popular revolts. Our strict measure of irregular leader exit therefore includes only 
the 24 cases of irregular leader exits that occurred in otherwise peaceful contexts but where 
dissidents had called for the incumbent national leader to step down at some point in the prior 
three months. 
The resulting dependent variable is a dichotomous variable equal to 1 when a leader 
loses power through irregular means and 0 otherwise. Table 1 reports the cases and the primary 
mechanism of departure. As one can see from the data, in almost all cases, security forces or 
civilian elites shifted their loyalties, resulting in the leader’s departure, further supporting our 
assumptions above. Of course, such loyalty shifts may have occurred in some cases without 
resulting in irregular leader departure, but Table 1 illustrates the mechanism at work in prior 
studies of mass movement outcomes.  
[Table 1 here] 
 To construct a dynamic variable for movement mass, we first generated a dichotomous 
variable equal to 1 when a nonviolent event occurs and 0 if otherwise. We obtained this 
indicator by extracting information from the variable “etype” in SCAD10,12. We coded as 
nonviolent events organized demonstrations, spontaneous demonstrations, general strikes and 
limited strikes, and riots because the common denominator of each of these event types is the 
intended use of peaceful means to obtain a political goal. We excluded events where an 
identifiable armed group engages in acts of violence, such as hit-and-run attacks, shootings, or 
bombings. 
 We then created a variable that measures the average number of participants in each 
event by extracting information from the “npart” variable in SCAD, which is based on a 
seven-point scale ranging from very low participation (less than ten people) to very high 
participation (over a million). We generated the variable mass to approximate the number of 
observed participants in nonviolent events per thousand people in the country’s national 
population. Our indicator of mass ranges from 0 to 132.634 participants per thousand 
(mean=.165, sd=2.094). Because of the non-normal distribution of this variable, we also 
created an alternate logged version of this variable, which we then standardized (by adding 
10 to each value) to yield only positive values. This indicator ranges from .508 to 14.888 
(mean=8.238, sd=3.022). We note that the indicator drops all instances where no participants 
were observed in the current observation, yielding a much smaller sample conditional on (a) 
the occurrence of an event; and (b) some nonzero number of participants observed.  
 We next derived a variable for the velocity of events. To obtain this, we counted the 
total number of events of nonviolent dissent in the seven days preceding the current country-
day. This indicator ranges from 0 to 189 (mean=48.405, sd=46.329).  
 Because momentum equals mass times velocity, we then created the interaction term 
momentum, which multiplies the mass and velocity of dissent for the current day. It ranges in 
value from 0 to 5649 (mean=6.463, sd=70.05). We also created an alternate measure of 
momentum that multiples the logged values of mass and velocity of dissent. This indicator 
ranges from 2.667 to 2195.354 (mean=469.367, sd=380.009).    
Because some scholars consider riots a form of violent dissent8, we created strict 
measures of mass, velocity, and momentum, which exclude riots and include only nonviolent 
methods of dissent, like protests and strikes.  
We implement a series of control variables that capture other factors that might affect 
the likelihood of leadership irregular exit. First, we control for the absolute change in the 
number of locations where nonviolent events took place by extracting information from the 
variable “sublocal” in SCAD12, which provides a numerical count of the individual localities 
where nonviolent dissent took place. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the 
likelihood of irregular leader change as incidences of resistance become more widespread 
throughout the country.  
Second, we expect that repression discourages dissent, therefore making events rarer 
over time13. However, higher levels of repression of nonviolent dissent might also be more 
likely to backfire, increase participation in the future, and elicit defections by security forces, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of political change9,14,15. We extract an indicator of 
repression from SCAD12, coded as 1 if security forces use nonlethal coercion against 
dissidents, 2 if security forces used lethal repression against dissidents, and 0 if otherwise.  
Third, because civil wars are relatively rarer in our sample than low-intensity 
violence, we also construct a variable measuring the number of violent events in the prior 
week based on event type 8 from the SCAD database, which we expect to be associated with 
a decreased likelihood of irregular leader change3,4,16,17.  
Additionally, widespread poverty may create economic grievances that undermine 
state capacity for effective response and generate or reinforce elite-level conflict with the 
government18,19,20. We therefore include a measure of logged GDP per capita (logged)21, 
which we expect to have a positive association with the likelihood of irregular leader exit. 
Finally, we include a measure of logged total state population21 to account for the fact that 
states with larger populations tend to have higher likelihoods of political instability22,23,24,25.  
 We estimate rare event logistic regression models on irregular leader exit because such 
outcomes occur in just .0001% of the observations under study. Table 2 presents eight model 
specifications. The models generally support our hypothesis, showing that the effect of 
momentum is generally positive and significant regardless of whether we use the general 
measure (Models 1, 3, and 4), rare events logit models on the full sample (Models 1 and 3) or 
restricting the pool of observations in which an event occurred (Models 4, 5, and 6), and both 
the normal measure of mass (Models 1, 3, and 4) and the logged measure of mass (Model 6). 
We do not find evidence of a significant association when we exclude riots from the sample 
(Models 2 and 7), although violent events alone are not significantly correlated with irregular 
leader exit (Model 8). Likelihood ratio tests and Wald tests suggest that including the 
momentum indicator significantly improves model performance in all of the models.  
 The substantive correlation between momentum and the predicted probability of 
irregular leader exit are considerable—the probability more than triples from the minimum to 
the maximum values—although as a rare event, the absolute values of the predicted 
probabilities are fairly modest. To illustrate the effect of momentum as a function of mass times 
velocity, we plot the predicted probabilities of irregular leader exits only on days in which a 
protest takes place based on the rare events conditional logistic regression performed in Model 
4. Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of irregular leader exit at different values of velocity, 
when mass mobilization equals 1.5%, 3.5%, or 5% of national population size.  
[Figure 1 here] 
 We note that most of the statistically significant observations come at upper ranges of 
the interaction term (e.g. when velocity is greater than 160 and mass mobilization is greater 
than 3.5% of the population), suggesting that the relationship between momentum and irregular 
leader exit is most relevant at the upper bounds of mass and velocity. Because mass 
mobilization rarely occurs at such significant levels, we draw on Model 6, in which mass is 
logged, to plot the marginal effects of velocity on irregular leader exit given quantile values of 
logged mass (Figure 2), correcting for the non-normality of the mass indicator.  
[Figure 2 here] 
 Figure 2 further supports the finding that when mass is at its highest value – constituting 
about 132 people per thousand, or 13.263% of the national population – the probability of 
irregular leader exit surpasses 60% at the highest levels of velocity. Moreover, at the highest 
participation rates, the probability of irregular leader exit increases at a velocity of 40 events 
per week (observations that exceed this value represent the 58th percentile of cases in our 
sample).  
 However, it is important to note that below the 75th percentile of mass (0.138% of the 
national population size) and the median value of velocity28, the probability of irregular leader 
exit on any given day remains low. When velocity is set at or below the median value of 28 
events per week, no levels of mass increased the probability of success for nonviolent 
movements. This is consistent with the fact that both large-scale mass mobilization and 
irregular leader exit are rare events, as well as the fact that these figures are based on the 
conservative assumption that a protest occurs on the same day as the leader departs. 
 Notably, in no observations did participation exceed 13.3% of the national population, 
thus making the 25% threshold of participation identified in prior studies1 moot in this regional 
sample. However, the findings also demonstrate that in the rare cases where over 3.5% of the 
national population does mobilize at a high velocity, the predicted probability of irregular 
leader exit increases substantially3. Taken together, these statistical and substantive results 
provide an important corrective to existing studies which suggest that peak participation rates 
alone are sufficient to tip the balance to success1,2,3,5,6,7. 
 With regard to the other covariates, the diffusion of nonviolent dissent has a positive 
association across four of the seven models, providing support for our intuition that more 
widespread diffusion of events is associated with greater disruptive potential26. Second, in 
Models 3 and 8, we find no credible evidence that violent events have a systematic correlation 
with leadership departure, consistent with prior studies3,4,8,17. The effect of population is 
negative and significant across all models, showing that larger countries experience fewer 
irregular leader exits. Moreover, GDP per capita has no effect, suggesting that the effects of 
momentum are robust across countries with varying levels of economic development. Finally, 
the coefficient for repression is consistently positive and statistically significant: a greater 
number of repressive incidents correlates with a higher risk of irregular leader exit. This finding 
might provide evidence in support for a backfire process leading to security forces 
defection4,8,9,14, or represent an endogenous process, whereby the most threatening mass 
mobilizations are those that both respond to and elicit higher rates of repression16. Experimental 
studies or those that can account for endogenous processes could further assess these 
possibilities. However, importantly, higher instances of repression by state forces does not 
appear to undermine the strong positive correlation between movement momentum and 
leadership change. In summary, we find robust evidence that momentum—or mass times 
velocity—has a notable association with the likelihood of irregular leader exit. The effect of 




 There are several important limitations to the current study. First, the findings address 
correlation and not causation, by the nature of the data and design; additional research could 
address causal processes more directly. Second, we test our propositions on data from one 
region because of data availability on our core variables of interest; however, we believe that 
the insights derived from the African context can apply more generally and recommend further 
research to probe their generalizability around the world when reliable global data become 
available. Third, we note here that irregular leader exit does not necessarily result in equitable, 
peaceful, or stable outcomes, nor does it guarantee that movement success obtains in the long 
term. Further research could assess the degree to which irregular leader exits induced by mass 
resistance yield such outcomes, although some existing work suggests that when mass 
resistance is primarily nonviolent, transitions to democracy are more common than when 
resistance is violent4,27,28,29. Fourth, we were not able to assess whether transnational actors – 
such as foreign governments, international organizations, international media, transnational 
solidarity networks, or the private sector – have influence on either the capacity of dissidents 
to organize consistently, or the decision calculus of the leaders and their pillars of support. Data 
collection regarding attempts at such impact could further research in this area as well, although 
we caution that existing research finds little support for the notion that powerful foreign states 
can effectively back nonviolent resistance movements without undermining their local bases 
of support4. Finally, our research design limits us to understanding the correlation between 
momentum and irregular leader exit on any given day; it does not assess the cumulative impacts 
of mobilization over a longer term, nor does it evaluate threshold effects specifically. Future 
work could attempt to study these relationships more dynamically.  
 Despite these limitations, our study points to three important insights. First, movements 
mobilizing a relatively modest proportion of the population have increased their disruptive 
potential when they concentrate high-participation nonviolent activities in time. Such 
nonviolent events are not limited to protests: many involve a diverse array on nonviolent 
techniques, such as strikes, boycotts, and other forms of mass non-cooperation. Yet for 
movements and activists attempting to assess their potential for political change, momentum 
equals mass times velocity. Second, the momentum of the movements under study was more 
dependent upon their own resources, organization, and stamina than on the opponent’s 
response. In this regard, our findings suggest that movements can in fact increase their 
momentum by planning numerous nonviolent mass mobilizations in concentrated intervals in 
sequence. And the momentum of the movement in such instances is not likely to be diminished 
by the way the state responds. Finally, these findings also shed light on a simple and yet far-
reaching fact regarding social movement mobilization: activists may be able to estimate their 
absolute levels of momentum by taking into account the number of participants in current 
events as well as how many events occur in relatively short periods of time. The more people 
involved, and the more concentrated nonviolent events become in time, the more momentum 
the movements have. And, although we cannot specify a causal relationship, our results show 
that high levels of momentum significantly correlate with a high likelihood that the leader exits 
through irregular means across a large number of robustness checks. This intuitive yet elegant 
metric should be accessible to many people who are engaged in activism on the ground and 
seek a better sense of how strong their movements are becoming day to day.  
 
Methods 
 We rely on panel data to study the correlation between movement momentum and 
irregular leader exit in African countries between 1990-2014. We use a variety of estimation 
techniques. No statistical methods were used to pre-determine sample sizes, but our sample 
sizes are considerably larger than those reported in previous publications.2,3,4,9 
Measurement. We describe the construction of our variables in the main text however, 
we offer some additional details on several measures here. To develop the dependent indicator 
for irregular leader exit, we extract the variable “EXIT” in ARCHIGOS and retain only the 
instances of leaders losing power through irregular means, defined as leader removal “in 
contravention of explicit rules and established conventions”11, and typically due to conflicts 
between domestic forces involving the threat or use of contentious political activities, popular 
revolts, coups, and assassinations, as well as cases where external intervention or warfare 
resulted in the leader’s removal. In the text above, we report findings based on the strict 
measure of 24 irregular leader exits only. In the Supplementary Information, we report findings 
based on the measure of all 45 irregular leader exits; the findings are consistent with our overall 
analysis.  
 To construct our variable for mass, we rely on the Npart variable from SCAD12  as well 
as an indicator of annual national population size from the World Bank.21 Npart measures the 
total number of participants in each event as follows: 1 = less than 10; 2 = 10 to 100; 3 = 101 
to 1,000; 4 = 1,001 to 10,000; 5 = 10,001 to 100,000; 6 = 100,001 to 1,000,000; 7 = over 
1,000,0001. We set the number of participants to 9 for the “very low” category and to 1,000,001 
for the “very high” category, while simply taking the average number of participants for all the 
remaining intervals in the scale. We then divided the total number of daily participants in 
protest by the national population size and normalized the variable to reflect participants per 
thousand for ease of interpretation.  
 Statistical analyses. We estimate rare event logistic regression models on irregular 
leader exit because such outcomes occur in just .0001% of the observations under study. In 
several models, we estimate conditional logistic regression on irregular leader exit, which 
estimates the models only in cases where dissidents are observed protesting in the current 
observation. For all models, we include a cubic polynomial approximation using a variable on 
the years since the last leader irregular exit to correct for time dependence, since leader 
irregular exits are more likely to recur when there is a recent history of leader irregular exit12,22. 
Two-tailed tests are applied. We cluster standard errors by country since the variance may 
differ systematically across states. Likelihood ratio tests are performed on logistic regressions 
of the model, and Wald tests are performed on rare events logistic regressions of the model. 
Finally, we estimate the variance inflation factor (VIF) and find no evidence of 
multicollinearity among our covariates; the correlation coefficients across all variables likewise 
show low correlations across all covariates. The results are consistent across various additional 
robustness checks and alternative specifications, which are included in the Supplementary 
Information. 
Reporting Summary. Further information on research design is available in the Nature 
Research Reporting Summary linked to this article. 
 
Data availability: The STATA dataset that supports the findings of this study are publicly 
available for download from the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JYM19E. 
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to E.C or M.B. 
 
Code availability: The custom code that supports the findings of this study are publicly 
available for download from the Harvard Dataverse: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/JYM19E. 
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Figure 1: The effect of velocity on irregular leader exit at different values of mass. The 
figure plots the predicted probability of leader irregular exit (y axis) at different values of 
velocity of nonviolent dissent (x axis) and different levels of mass. All other variables are held 
at their means. Momentum (a function of mass times velocity) is significantly correlated with 
the probability of irregular leader exit (coefficient=.004; p=0.003; n=16,420). We generated 
this figure using the marginsplots function in STATA, based on Model 4. The bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals, although these are artificial because Stata calculates them using the 
delta approach and so ought not be interpreted as numerically meaningful. We used the 
conditional logit model because it produces more conservative statistical estimates. However, 
we used conditional logit (rather than rare events conditional logit) regression because rare 
events logistic regression models preclude the visualization of two-variable marginal effects.  
 
 
Figure 2. The effect of velocity on irregular leader exit at quantiles of mass (logged). The 
figure plots the effect of velocity on the probability of leader irregular exit (y axis) at different 
values of velocity (x axis) and different quantile values of mass of nonviolent dissent. All other 
variables are held at their means. Momentum (a function of mass times velocity) is significantly 
correlated with the probability of irregular leader exit (coefficient=.004; p<.001; n=13,969). 
We generated this figure using the marginsplots function in STATA, based on Model 6. For 
ease of interpretation, we report the raw values of mass as percentage of the total national 
population rather than the logged mass indicator. The bars indicate 95% confidence intervals, 
although these are artificial because Stata calculates them using the delta approach and so ought 
not be interpreted as numerically meaningful. We use the conditional logit model because it 
produces more conservative statistical estimates. However, we use conditional logit (rather 
than rare events conditional logit) regression because rare events logistic regression models 









Name Date of Exit Mechanism of Exit 
Primary Agents 
/ Defectors 
Mali Traore 26-Mar-91 
Removed by military in the 




Removed by rebels in the 
midst of worker protests rebels 
Algeria Benjedid 11-Jan-92 
Removed by military amidst 
election-related protests military 
Nigeria Shonekan 17-Nov-93 
Removed by military in the 
midst of a worker's strike military 
Lesotho Mokhehle 17-Aug-94 




Sierra Leone Strasser 17-Jan-96 Removed by military military 
Niger Ousmane 27-Jan-96 Removed by military military 
Sierra Leone Kabbah 25-May-97 Removed by military military 
Guinea-
Bissau Vieira 7-May-99 Removed by military military 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Konan 
Bedie 25-Dec-99 Removed by military military 
Cote d'Ivoire Guei 25-Oct-00 Popular protest unknown 
Dem. Rep. of 
the Congo 
Laurent 
Kabila 16-Jan-01 Removed by military military 
Madagascar Radsiraka 6-Jul-02 






Republic Patasse 15-Mar-03 
Removed by rebels / military 

















nana 17-Mar-09 Removed by military military 
Guinea 
Dadis 




Ben Ali 14-Jan-11 Popular protest police 
Egypt Mubarak 11-Feb-11 Popular protest military 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Laurent 
Gbagbo 11-Apr-11 Removed by military military 
Egypt Morsi 3-Jul-13 Popular protest military 
Burkina Faso Traore 1-Nov-14 Removed by military military 
 
Table 2. Correlates of irregular leader exit  
      
VARIABLES b SE P-value CI low CI high 
Model 1           
Velocity -0.012 0.008 0.130 -0.028 0.004 
Mass -0.074 0.061 0.224 -0.194 0.045 
Momentum 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.006 
Change in locations  0.057 0.020 0.005 0.018 0.096 
Repression (lag) 2.234 0.477 0.000 1.299 3.169 
Total state population (logged) -0.308 0.297 0.300 -0.890 0.274 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.139 0.278 0.617 -0.684 0.406 
Constant -3.605 4.162 0.386 -11.762 4.552 
      
Observations 290,694         
Model 2      
Velocity (strict) -0.013 0.012 0.272 -0.035 0.01 
Mass (strict) -0.078 0.066 0.234 -0.208 0.051 
Momentum (strict) 0.003 0.001 0.064 -0.000 0.005 
Change in locations  0.054 0.02 0.006 0.015 0.092 
Repression (lag) 2.339 0.331 0.000 1.691 2.988 
Total state population (logged) -0.34 0.306 0.266 -0.939 0.259 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.007 0.278 0.979 -0.537 0.552 
Constant -5.931 4.966 0.232 -15.664 3.803 
      
Observations 291,771     
Model 3           
Number of violent events 0.005 0.226 0.983 -0.437 0.447 
Velocity -0.011 0.008 0.199 -0.027 0.006 
Mass -0.077 0.059 0.192 -0.192 0.039 
Momentum 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.005 
Change in locations  0.055 0.021 0.009 0.014 0.096 
Repression (lag) 2.278 0.467 0.000 1.363 3.192 
Total state population (logged) -0.292 0.291 0.317 -0.863 0.279 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.134 0.283 0.636 -0.690 0.421 
Constant -3.788 4.504 0.400 -12.616 5.039 
      
Observations 290,694         
Model 4      
Momentum 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.007 
Velocity -0.018 0.022 0.432 -0.061 0.026 
Mass -0.118 0.065 0.070 -0.246 0.010 
Change in locations 0.033 0.022 0.126 -0.009 0.076 
Repression (lag) 1.375 0.582 0.018 0.235 2.516 
Total state population (logged) -0.472 0.431 0.274 -1.316 0.373 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.079 0.277 0.775 -0.623 0.464 
Constant -0.238 5.463 0.965 -10.946 10.469 
      
Observations 16,420         
Model 5      
Momentum (strict) 0.003 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.006 
Velocity (strict) -0.015 0.019 0.436 -0.051 0.022 
Mass (strict) -0.113 0.072 0.113 -0.254 0.027 
Change in locations  0.033 0.016 0.038 0.002 0.065 
Repression (lag) 1.377 0.567 0.015 0.266 2.488 
Total state population (logged) -0.491 0.353 0.164 -1.184 0.201 
GDP per capita (logged)  0.032 0.315 0.920 -0.586 0.650 
Constant -1.850 6.407 0.773 -14.407 10.708 
      
Observations 17,497         
Model 6      
Momentum (based on logged mass) 0.018 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.030 
Velocity  -0.180 0.081 0.026 -0.339 -0.022 
Mass (logged) -0.376 0.157 0.017 -0.684 -0.068 
Change in locations  0.041 0.044 0.355 -0.046 0.128 
Repression (lag)  1.452 1.163 0.212 -0.827 3.730 
Total state population (logged) -0.953 0.609 0.117 -2.146 0.240 
GDP per capita (logged) -0.085 0.670 0.899 -1.399 1.228 
Constant 12.822 8.477 0.130 -3.792 29.437 
      
Observations 13,969         
Model 7      
Momentum (based on strict mass logged) 0.014 0.008 0.058 -0.000 0.029 
Velocity (strict) -0.154 0.096 0.107 -0.342 0.033 
Mass (strict; logged) -0.241 0.264 0.362 -0.759 0.277 
Change in locations  0.036 0.052 0.487 -0.066 0.139 
Repression (lag) 1.345 0.945 0.155 -0.508 3.197 
Population (logged) -0.744 0.629 0.237 -1.978 0.489 
GDP per capita (logged) 0.230 0.898 0.798 -1.530 1.990 
Constant 0.313 12.720 0.980 -24.618 25.244 
      
Observations 13,258         
Model 8      
Number of violent events  0.033 0.053 0.532 -0.070 0.136 
Constant -9.334 0.660 0.000 -10.628 -8.039 
      
Observations 411,601         
Note: Time dependency control included.  
 
